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ABSTRACT
We analyze the relationship between wage distribution, degree of redistribu-
tion of the Social Security and e¤ective retirement age. We develop a two-staged
political economy model. In the …rst stage government chooses the redistribu-
tion level of the Social Security Program, according to three di¤erent criteria. In
second stage the retirement age is elected through a majority voting process by
agents with di¤erent wages, knowing exactly the redistribution level and voting
accordingly. We analyze the di¤erent elected retirement age under each govern-
ment criterium.
Key words: Wage distribution; retirement age; level of redistribution; median
voter.
2” I know we make our own reality and we always have a choice, but how much is
pre-ordained?” John Lennon.
1. Introduction
Most of the OECD countries are preparing reforms in the public pensions schemes
in order to solve the …nancing problem of the Social Security System. The main
reform that is being proposed is the delay in the retirement age. Due to this, the
retirement age has recently become an important issue.
In the present paper, as in our previous one, Lacomba and Lagos [2000]; we
seek to analyze the importance of the retirement age by considering this retirement
age the issue to be collectively elected. In consequence, we consider retirement
age as a compulsory age that will be the variable to be chosen by the individuals
through a majority voting process. In this manner we can deduce not only the
popular support lying behind each retirement proposal, but also the economic
e¤ects derived from changes in this elected retirement age.
One of the more signi…cant variables that a¤ects individual retirement deci-
sions is the wage, therefore the wage distribution of the population will play an
important role in the determination of the implemented retirement age. For this
reason we have studied the behaviour of countries with a di¤erent wage distribu-
tion with regard to the retirement age in order to test the relationship between
retirement age and wage distribution.
In our empirical tests, we have observed a positive partial correlation between
wage distribution and e¤ective retirement age. That is, the higher the wage
inequality is, the higher the retirement age will be. See …gures 1 and 2.
The simple bivariate regressions that we test are not enough to conclude the
positive e¤ect of inequality on the retirement age.1 But from this intuition arises
t h em o d e ld e v e l o p e di nt h i sa r t i c l e .
As Casamatta et al.[2000]; we develop a two-staged political economy model.
In the …rst stage government chooses the redistribution level of the Social Security
Program, according to three di¤erent criteria. At this constitutional stage the
choice is made under the knowledge that the retirement age will be chosen by
majority voting in the second stage.
1See appendix.
3In the second stage, the majority voting election of retirement age is made by
individuals knowing exactly the redistribution level and voting accordingly.
In societies where the pretax median voter’s wage is below the pretax mean
wage (the usual assumption), the retirement age being chosen through majority
voting system allows us to observe the following: the less wage dispersion a soci-
ety has, that is, the less the di¤erence between the mean and the median wage is,
the later the socially elected retirement age will be. So, if Social Security System
increases its level of redistribution, reducing the di¤erence between post-tax me-
dian and mean income, then the elected retirement age will be delayed. All that
will lead to positive e¤ects on total production from redistribution.
Also, our model implies that not only the poor people but also the richest one
would prefer some level of redistribution, because of the elected retirement age
would be closer to the rich people’s optimal ones.
The organization of this paper is as follows: the next section presents the
theoretical model; the third one shows the majority voting process on retirement
age; the fourth section presents the government decision on redistribution; in
the …fth one we show the concluding remarks and the paper winds up with the
appendix showing the empirical tests.
2. The model
In this model we have a continuous distribution of agents on wage that will be
located between a minimum and a maximum wage level, [wp;w r]; belonging to
the same generation and di¤erentiated only in wage. There is no uncertainty on
the length of life and each individual lives exactly T years. On the …rst R years
the individual will be a full time worker whereas on the following T-R ones the
individuals will be retired.
As in our previous model, Lacomba and Lagos [2000]; these individuals have
a stationary and temporally independent utility function, which is separable and
strictly increasing in consumption and leisure. Leisure yields utility to the indi-
vidual only when this individual is retired. So the only way utility coming from
leisure can be modi…ed is by changing the retirement age. The pension bene-
…ts are received only after they leave the labor force. The instantaneous utility



















i is the consumption at period t of agent i. The utility of consumption is
twice di¤erentiable with u0 > 0, u00 < 0.L e tµ
t be the leisure at period t,b e i n g












= v; in their
retirement years. Besides, we assume that the elasticity of marginal utility of
consumption with respect to consumption ½r = ¡cu00(c)=u0 (c) is non-increasing
a n ds m a l l e rt h a no n e . 2
Workers plan the consumption, savings and retirement in order to maximize
the discounted value of utility subject to their lifetime budget constraint. We
assume that individuals earn an annual wage, wi, until they retire. Later, they
receive an annual pension, pi, from a Social Security Program h¿;®i where ¿ is a
constant Social Security contribution tax rate and ® a variable that measures the
redistribution level of the system. The labor supply is constant in order to avoid
incentives problems.
Social Security Programs may be …nanced through two di¤erent systems. On
the one hand, a ”pay as you go” system (PAYG) where the pensions of retired
people are paid by working people through taxes. On the other hand, a ”fully
funded” system where the pensions of retired people are …nanced through the
return of the taxes that they paid during their working life. In the PAYG the
return will depend on the population growth rate, while in a fully funded system
will depend on the interest rate. When the population growth rate is identical to
the interest rate, if the rest of parameters of Social Security Program are equals,
the pension that retired people receives will be the same in both …nancing systems.
I nt h ep r e s e n tm o d e lt h ep o p u l a t i o ng r o w t hr a t ea n dt h ei n t e r e s tr a t ea r e
constant and equal to zero. Therefore the pension will be the same independently
of the system. We assume a fully funded system due to that there are no retired
people during the working years of the …rst generation
Let ±; r b et h es u b j e c t i v er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ea n dt h em a r k e tr a t eo f

















































We assume that saving earns no interest and that individuals do not discount
their future income, (± = r =0 ) . There is a perfect capital market, so people may
borrow at zero interest rate. These assumptions together with the separability
and concavity of utility function imply that each individual consumes the same
in every period, ct
i = ci for any t.
Thus the utility function of an individual over his life-cycle can be reduced to





(Rwi (1 ¡ ¿)+( T ¡ R)pi): (2.5)





being R=(T ¡ R) the ratio between working and retirement years and Wi =
[(1 ¡ ®)$ + ®wi] a linear combination of the mean wage ,$, and the individ-
ual i’s wage, wi,w h e r e® 2 [0;1]; with ® =0meaning full redistribution, and
® =1 , actuarially fairness.3
The budget is annualy balanced, that is, total tax contributions are equal to
total pension bene…ts.
3. Majority Voting Process
In this section, the agents have to choose the compulsory retirement age through a
majority voting system. The others parameters are exogeneously given. According
to this, we can start studying the optimal retirement age for each individual at
birth. Once we substitute (2.5) and (2.6) for (2.4), and after some simpli…cations,
the optimization problem that the individual faces is as follows








[wi (1 ¡ ¿)+¿ ((1 ¡ ®)$ + ®wi)]
¶
+( T ¡ R)v (3.1)












00 (ci) < 0 (3.3)
In this manner we obtain the optimal retirement for each individual. Since
(3.3) is negative for all R, the utility function is concave with respect to retirement
age. That is, preferences are single peaked with respect to R: Therefore the median
voter Theorem may be also applied.4 Let R¤
i be the optimal retirement age for
agent i; that is, agent with wage wi.T h e n i f R¤
i is a monotonic function of wi
the voting equilibrium can be easily obtained since the median voter will be the
individual with median wage. In order to determine if this occurs we use the





[1 ¡ ¿ (1 ¡ ®)][u0 (ci)(1¡ ½r)]
H
(3.4)
This expression is positive, @R¤
i=@wi > 0; since (1 ¡ ½r) > 0 (recall that we
assume a relative risk coe¢cient less than one). If the coe¢cient of relative risk
aversion is larger than one, ½r > 1, the sign of (3.4) would be the opposite,
@R¤
i=@wi < 0; which would yield opposite results.
Remark 1. The optimal retirement age is increasing with the wage.5 The median
wage voter is the median voter.
Therefore the higher the wage is, the later an agent wishes to stop working,
i.e., richer people desire to work longer than poorer people (see Muñoz [1995]).
4We suppose voters have no strategic behaviour. They vote for the closest age to their own
optimal retirement age.
5It is important to note that if an agent i increases his wage, then the mean wage ($) will
be a¤ected too. But here we are focusing on another problem, how the optimal retirement age
would change if the individual is in di¤erent levels of wage. In this case the mean wage does
not change, thus we assume @$=@wi =0 .
7Higher compulsory retirement age yields higher total production, since delaying
retirement age implies that there will be more workers in the society.6
Recall that we consider that the higher the amount of people close to the mean
wage the more egalitarian the society is. This way, it can be pointed out that if we
consider two societies, both with the same mean wage, when median wage is lower
than mean wage, which is the usual case, the more egalitarian one will have the
highest production and the highest total comsumption. Since the median voter
in the egalitarian economy will have a larger wage and, hence, he will choose a
higher retirement age.
Proposition 3.1. When median wage is lower than mean wage, given a Social
Security Program, the closer the median wage to the mean one is,7 the higher
the retirement age would be. More egalitarian societies yield higher level of total
production.8
The proof follows directly from (3.4).
Another issue to observe is how the result of the voting changes when the
redistribution level of the Social Security Program is modi…ed. In order to come





¿ (wi ¡ $)u0 (ci)(1¡ ½r)
H
(3.5)
T h es i g no ft h i se x p r e s s i o nd e p e n d so nt h ew a g el e v e lo fe a c hi n d i v i d u a l .
>From (3.5) and the comparative-static response three results are obtained,
but we focus just on the most realistic one, namely, when median wage is below
6Labor supply could depend on R but as we assume a …xed labor supply there will not be
incentives problem and this e¤ect is avoided. We also consider that labor demand is able to
absorb any increase in the working period.
7Assuming that mean wage is …xed.
8This result goes apparently in opposite direction with the partial correlation refered in the
introduction, that is, the higher the wage inequality is, the higher the retirement age will be.
But it is necessary to point out that in the model there are no retired people. However, in
the empirical contrast we have used real data where, obviously, retired people are taken into
account. It is logical to assume that these retired people would support the highest retirement
age, since this would a¤ect positively the dependency ratio and it would therefore improve the
pension bene…ts. Due to this retired people’s weight, the median voter’s wage would be higher
than median wage and it could be higher than mean wage. If this would happen the theoretical
results would coincide with the empirical contrast.
8mean wage.9 Let R¤
m be the optimal retirement age for median voter, that is, the
agent with median wage wm:
Proposition 3.2. Let wm <$then @R¤
m=@® < 0.A ni n c r e a s ei nt h ed e g r e eo f
redistribution delay the elected retirement age.
The proof follows directly from (3.5). The median voter will increase his
income due to the increase in the redistribution degree, so he will have a later
optimal retirement age that will be implemented through the voting process. All
that will lead to an increase in the working population and therefore to a rise in
the total production of the society.
Thus given a Social Security Program with parameters h®;¿i, increasing pro-
gresivity of ® would produce a rise in total production10.
Since in this system retirement age is chosen by the population in a voting
process, it may be better for the richer people some degree of redistribution.
This way, by increasing this degree, the elected retirement age would be therefore
closer to their optimal ones. Moreover, it may happen that in high wage dispersion
societies, richest people would be better with a full redistribution program (® =0 )
rather than with an individual’s earning one (® =1 ) , given that implemented
retirement age will be chosen by the median voter on a voting process.
This occurs since the median voter would receive much more money on his
p e n s i o ni nt h e… r s tc a s et h a ni nt h es e c o n do n e .T h i sw o u l dl e a dh i mt oh a v ea
higher optimal retirement age. So the elected retirement age would be closer to
the one preferred by the richest people.
4. Government Decision
We now analyze how the degree of redistribution is determined. Social Security
Program is de…ned by two parameters, h®;¿i; where the tax level is exogeneously
given and the redistribution level of Social Security is determined by the govern-
ment.
9When median wage is equal to mean wage, wm = $; @R¤
m=@® =0 : That is, changes in the
redistribution level do not alter the elected retirement age. When median wage is above mean
wage, wm >$ , @R¤
m=@® > 0: More redistribution leads to decreases in the total production
since retirement age is put forward.
10T h es a m er e s u l t sc a nb eo b t a i n e di f ,i n s t e a do f@R¤
i=@®; we would have calculated @R¤
i=@¿:
That is, for wm <$, increases in the tax level would delay the elected retirement age.
9We de…ne three social welfare criteria. A government with a Downsian cri-
terium that cares only about the median citizen. A government with a right-wing
criterium that cares only about the richest people. A government with a left-wing
criterium that cares only about the poorest people.
If the political parties do not have policy preferences and the policy space is
one dimensional then the only possible government criterium in equilibrium is the
Downsian one. But if parties are ideological ones and they are uncertain about
preferences of the voters then they may have di¤erent criteria in equilibrium.
Therefore, as Lee [1999]; we simply assume that the three criteria are possible in
a majority voting context and analyze the results under each one.
The government chooses the level of redistribution taking into account that
this one will a¤ect the voting process on R.O n c e® is determined, retirement age
will be chosen democratically, as described in the previous section, i.e., it will be
the median voter’s optimal one.
Given that wm is median voter’s wage level, R¤
m will be the implemented
retirement age. We de…ne an individual indirect utility function, V; on the median




m (®);®) ´ Tu(c(®)) + (T ¡ R
¤
m (®))v





m (®);®) ´ max
®
Tu(ci (®)) + (T ¡ R
¤
m (®))v for i = p;m;r (4.1)
being Vi the indirect utility function of the poorest individual, Vp, the median,
Vm, and the richest one, Vr, depending on the Government’s criterium. By di¤er-
entiating V (R¤













where the …rst term, @Vi=@®, gives us the direct impact on the individuals’ utility
of a change in the redistribution system, ®: The second term, (@Vi=@R)(@R¤
m=@®);
shows the indirect impact of an increase in the redistribution level on their welfare,
as a consequence of the changes on the retirement chosen by the median voter.
104.1. Downsian Criterium
In this model, the median citizen is the individual with the median wage, so we
consider that under Downsian criterium, government cares about median worker’s
wage. Therefore, here the government maximizes the utility of the median wage’s
worker, Vm; with respect to the redistribution degree, ®.




m (®);®) ´ max
® Tu(cm (®)) + (T ¡ R
¤
m (®))v (4.3)
Let ®m be the solution to (4.3).
Proposition 4.1. Let wm <$(wm >$ ) then ®m =0( ®m =1 ):



















m¿ (wm ¡ $) < 0 (4.5)
The less redistributive the program is, the lower the utility of the median worker










Since the utility function is evaluated at R¤
m, (4.6) is always equal to zero.
Hence, the indirect impact will be zero.
Therefore, if wm <$(wm >$ ) then dVm=d® < 0( dVm=d® > 0) what implies
®m =0( ®m =1 ): Q.E.D.
Although changes in the redistribution level lead to changes on the retirement
age chosen by the median voter, which a¤ect indirectly the agent’s utility, for the
11median worker this indirect e¤ect will be null, since the elected retirement age
will be his own optimal one.
Therefore, in this case the redistribution degree chosen by the government will
depend only on the relation between median and mean wage. When median vot-
ers’ wage is lower than mean wage, i. e., wm <$ , the government under Downsian
criterium will implement a Social Security System with maximal redistribution:
Consequently, from Downsian criterium arises that when wm <$ , the Social
Security System will be fully redistributive. But, in this model, we do not consider
retired people, who could lead median voter’s wage to be higher than median and
mean wages.11 In that case, we could …nd societies in which more than 50% of the
working population have wages lower than mean wage and, however, under Down-
sian criterium, there would not be redistribution. Because when median voters’
wage is higher than mean wage, i. e., wm >$ ;the government under Downsian
criterium will implement a Social Security System with no redistribution, that is,
®m =1 :
4.2. Right-wing Criterium
Here the government maximizes the utility of the highest wage (wr) individuals,
Vr, with respect to the redistribution degree, ®.





m (®);®) ´ max
®
Tu(cr (®)) + (T ¡ R
¤
m (®))v (4.8)
Let ®r be the solution to (4.8).
Proposition 4.2. Let wm <$ :A right-wing criterium does not imply no redistribution:













The direct impact will be always positive. The less redistributive the program
is, the higher the utility of the richer worker would be.
11Given that retired people would support the highest retirement age, since there would be







m¿ (wr ¡ $) > 0 (4.10)










Since optimal retirement age of the richest individual, R¤
r; is higher than the
optimal one of the median voter, R¤
m; and taking into account the single peakness
of the preferences, when the retirement age is increased from R¤
m, the di¤erence
between the optimal retirement age of the low wage individuals and the compul-
sory one will be shorter. This will a¤ect his utility positively. In other words,
the richest group is currently working less than its optimum. This way, increases
in the working years lead to increases in the utility for the individuals. For this
reason (4.11) is always positive. On the other hand, the sign of (4.12) depends
on whether the median voter’s wage is above or below the mean wage (see (3.5)).
Hence, the indirect impact may be positive or negative.
When median voters’ wage is lower than the mean wage, i. e., wm <$ ;(4.12)
is negative. Hence, the indirect impact is negative.
As we have that the direct e¤ect, (4.10), is always positive, by these opposite
e¤ects, we can …nd a level of redistribution ®r < 1 where dVr=d® 6 0: Q.E.D.
Then it may be deduced that the richest people would be better with some
level of redistribution, i. e., ®r < 1:
On the other hand, although wm > $ is an unrealistic case, it is interesting to
include this result since allow us to compare it with the realistic case, wm <$ :
As it would be expected, if wm > $ and the government would have a right-wing
criterium, there would be no redistribution in the Social Security system.12
12In this case, both direct and indirect e¤ects have the same positive sign. This implies ®r =1 :
134.2.1. Numerical example
Here we show an example where the rich people are better with some degree of
redistribution than with no redistribution. In this exercise we calculate the utility
of the rich but evaluated at R¤
m; that is, the retirement age given by the voting









+( T ¡ R)v (4.13)
where Wi = wi(1 ¡ ¿)+¿ ((1 ¡ ®)$ + ®wi) with Wi = wi if ® =1 : In our




We have to determinate R¤
m; i.e., the optimal retirement age of the median























m in the utility function of the rich we obtain














We want to test if the utility of the rich with some redistribution is higher
than with no redistribution.




WmWr ¡ Wm > 2
p
wmwr ¡ wm
As wr = awm and $ = bwm with a>b>1 what we have to obtain is
2
p
(1 ¡ ¿ + ¿((1 ¡ ®)b + ®))(a(1 ¡ ¿)+¿((1 ¡ ®)b + ®a))
¡((1 ¡ ¿)+¿((1 ¡ ®)b + ®)) > 2
p
a ¡ 1
This inequality will be true when the highest and mean wages are much bigger
than the median wage. It is not di¢cult to …nd values where this inequality holds,
for instance: a =4 ;b=3 ;¿ =0 :3; ® =0 : In this particular case, the rich agents
prefer not only redistribution but full redistribution.
The intuition here is that although it is true that lowering ® decreases the rich-
est people’s wealth, this redistribution also would increase the median voter’s in-
come, (recall that wm <$ ) and this would delay his optimal retirement age. Con-
sequently, the compulsory age would be increased having positive consequences
for the richest group, since the implemented retirement age will be closer to their
optimal one.
4.3. Left-wing criterium
Here the government maximizes the utility of the lowest wage (wp) individuals,
Vp, with respect to the redistribution degree, ®.





m (®);®) ´ Tu(cp (®)) + (T ¡ R
¤
m (®))v (4.14)
Let ®p be the solution to (4.14).
Under the left-wing criterium the results are equal to those derived from right-
wing criterium but in the opposite way.
Proposition 4.3. Let wm <$ :A left-wing criterium does not imply maximal
redistribution:



















m¿ (wp ¡ $) < 0 (4.16)
T h el e s sr e d i s t r i b u t i v et h ep r o g r a mi s ,t h el o w e rt h eu t i l i t yo ft h ep o o ro n ew o u l d










Since optimal retirement age of the poorest individual, R¤
p; is lower than the
optimal one of the median voter, R¤
m; and taking into account the single peakness
of the preferences, when the retirement age is increased from R¤
m, the di¤erence
between the optimal retirement age of the low wage individuals and the compul-
sory one will be larger. This will have a negative e¤ect on his utility. In other
words, the poorest group is currently working more than its optimum. This way,
increases in the working years lead to decreases in the utility for the individuals.
For this reason (4.17) is always negative.
On the other hand, the sign of (4.18) depends on whether the median voter’s
w a g ei sa b o v eo rb e l o wt h em e a nw a g e( s e e( 3 . 5 ) ) . H e n c e ,t h ei n d i r e c ti m p a c t
may be positive or negative.
When median voters’ wage is lower than mean wage, i. e., wm <$ ;(4.18)
is negative. Hence, the indirect impact is positive, and since the direct e¤ect is
always negative, by these opposite e¤ects, we can …nd a level of redistribution
®p > 0 where dVp=d® 6 0.
Q.E.D.
Hence, when wm <$ ;it could be possible that a left-wing criterium does not
imply maximal redistribution..
An intuitive explanation can be given to understand the case in which ®p > 0.
It is easy to check that if the government could implement both parameters (R;®),
16in the left-wing criterium, the poorest individual’s optimal redistribution degree
would be full redistribution. But since we are considering the second-best option
for government, that is, it chooses a paramater (®) and people choose the other
one (R), the implemented retirement age will be the median voter’s one. Then, it
may be inferred that the poorest individual would not prefer the maximal degree
of redistribution because they will have to work more than their optimum.
On the other hand, with wm > $ and a left-wing government, there would be
maximal redistribution in the Social Security system.13
In summary, we have analyzed three di¤erent criteria in order to determine the
level of redistribution of the Social Security system. Under Downsian criterium
since there is no indirect e¤ect, the …nal level of redistribution depends only on
the relation between median and mean wage. This explains why are so di¤erent
the results under Downsian and left-wing criterium.
Under Downsian criterium, if wm <$ , given that the median wage worker
always works until his optimal retirement age, there is maximal redistribution.
Under left-wing criterium, if wm <$, given that there is a decrease in the utility
of the lowest wage worker derived from an increase in the compulsory retirement
age due to a higher redistribution, it is possible to …nd a Social Security with no
maximal redistribution.
Under right-wing criterium, when wm <$ , without altruism, it is possible to
…nd some positive level of redistribution, in spite of a right-wing government.
5. Conclusions
We have tried to analyze the relation between wage distribution and e¤ective re-
tirement age. According to this, we have developed a voting process on compulsory
retirement age, once the level of redistribution of pension bene…ts is determined
by the government. This way, we can study the popular support lying behind
each retirement proposal.
Although considering the retirement age as compulsory could seem ”excesive”,
most of the countries have a Social Security Program without ‡exibility in pen-
sionable age (Disney, [1996]):
13In this case, both direct and indirect e¤ects have the same negative sign. This implies
®p =0 :
17Moreover, empirical studies (Gruber and Wise, [1997]) have shown that there
is a strong relationship between the age at which bene…ts are available and depar-
ture from the labor force. That is, social provisions themselves provide enormous
incentive to leave the labor market. Therefore, to assume R as the age at which
people have to leave the labor force is not so excesive.
The results obtained are rather intuitive. The optimal retirement age increases
with the wage level. If the median voter’s wage is lower than mean wage, the
median voter’s income is increasing with the degree of redistribution. Then if the
degree of redistribution is raised, the elected retirement age will be larger and,
consequently, the people will work longer. Therefore, the degree of redistribution
might be positively correlated to the total production through retirement age.
In our model, median voter’s wage being higher than the mean wage implies
that less egalitarian countries will have higher retirement ages. This case would
explain the positive partial correlation that we have found between inequality and
retirement ages.
Median voter’s wage being higher than the mean one in the regressions could
be possible although median wage would be lower than mean wage, due to the
presence of retired people in the voting process. Since the retired people would
support the highest retirement age, this would increase the median retirement
age.
This result shows the crucial role of the retired people in the di¤erent voting
processes, as in this case, in the election on retirement age.
With respect to the redistribution degree, we have analyzed three di¤erent
criteria. Under Downsian criterium, the …nal level of redistribution depends on
the relation between median and mean wage. Under right-wing criterium,it is
worth to note that it is possible, without altruism, to …nd some positive level of
redistribution. At the same time, under left-wing criterium we highlight that it
can be found a Social Security system with no full redistribution.
For future research, a new empirical insight could arise. Nowadays, almost
every industrialized countries face unfavorable demographic trends. A decrease
in the birth rate and an increase in the life expectancy a¤ect negatively on the
viability of the Social Security system. Moreover, this pressure is enforced by
another trend, employees are leaving the labour force at younger and younger
age. Therefore, we consider that it would be very interesting, to introduce in our
18model the aging of the population to study if the e¤ects of postponing retirement
age allow to guarantee the social bene…ts without increasing contribution rates.
196. Appendix
6.1. Empirical Results
Most of the countries have a compulsory retirement age. Besides, this compulsory
age is very similar in almost all the countries, around sixty …ve years. Due to this,
it would be very di¢cult to show that there exists a relation between retirement
age and wage distribution using these compulsory retirement ages.
For this reason, we decide to use a di¤erent data base, from U.S. Department of
Health and Human Service, the e¤ective retirement age. Although every country
has a compulsory retirement age, most of their Social Security Programs allow
for some ‡exibility. Workers may leave their jobs in an age di¤erent from the
compulsory one, but in these cases they will have to su¤er some kind of punishment
in terms of reduction of their pension bene…ts.
In contrast with the compulsory retirement age, signi…cant di¤erences can
be observed among countries when these e¤ective retirement ages are compared.
This allows us to verify if there is any relation between retirement age and wage
distribution.
We show two di¤erent regressions. We estimate by a OLS regression, where
the explanatory variable is the Gini coe¢cient14 and the explained one is the
e¤ective retirement age. We try to test the signi…cance of the Gini coe¢cient as
a variable that explains the e¤ective retirement age of the countries.
Ri = ¯1 + ¯2Ginii + Ui with i =1 ;:::;13
where Ri is the e¤ective retirement age and the error terms of the model Ui are
normally distributed. The results obtained in regression 1 are
OLS estimation t-statistic
^ ¯1 =5 4 :3
^ ¯2 =0 :25
R2 =0 :22
t =3 :98
14We use Gini coe¢cient as a proxy measure of the wage inequality, since this coe¢cient
provide us information about the distance between median and mean wage. This data-base is
described in Deininger and Squire [1996] and Atkinson et al [1995].
20Once the estimation is made, we obtain that the Gini coe¢cient is signi…cative
and, therefore, explains the e¤ective retirement age.15 Also, the Gini coe¢cient
and the e¤ective retiremente age are positively correlated since ^ ¯2 > 0: The
determinacy coe¢cient R2 is small, but we consider only an explanatory variable
and very few data.
In regression 1 we observe a small number of countries (table 1). In spite of
this, this table is useful since the data is very homogeneous and it allows us to
show a positive correlation between Gini coe¢cient and e¤ective retirement age.
>From regression 1 it can be derived that the higher the Gini coe¢cient, i.e.,
the less egalitarian a country is, the higher the e¤ective retirement age is. See
…gure 1.
With this …rst table the problem is that we do not have enough countries to
test it correctly. For that reason, we make another OLS estimation and we use
a second table (table 2) which is formed by a larger number of countries, all the
OECD countries (except Iceland). The results obtained are
OLS estimation t-statistic
^ ¯1 =5 4 :7
^ ¯2 =0 :21
R2 =0 :23
t =5 :26
where similar conclusions can be interpreted from this OLS estimation. Again,
we observe the positive correlation between the Gini coe¢cient and e¤ective re-
tirement age (see …gure 2). That is, the higher the wage inequality is, the higher
the retirement age will be.
Besides, given that the data-bases used in the empirical test are post-tax wage,
it can be infered that higher inequality leads to a lower level of redistribution (®)
in the Social Security program of our model. In this way, the empirical contrast
would show a negative relation between level of redistribution and retirement age.
In our model this would happen when the median voter’s wage be higher than
the mean wage.
15We test if H0 : ¯2 =0with a level of signi…cation of 5%. The statistic of contrast t =3 :98
is higher than the critical value t12;0:975 =2 :179; therefore we reject the null hypothesis.
21Table1
Gini levels16 E¤ective Retirement Age17
Finland, 1987 20.7 59.0
Sweden, 1987 22.0 63.3
Norway, 1986 23.4 63.8
Belgium, 1988 23.5 57.6
Luxembourg, 1985 23.8 58.4
Germany, 1984 25.0 60.5
Netherlands, 1987 26.8 58.8
France, 1984 29.6 59.2
United Kingdom, 1986 30.4 62.7
Italy, 1986 31.0 60.6
Switzerlands, 1982 32.3 64.6
Ireland, 1987 33.0 63.4
United States, 1986 34.1 63.6
16Source: Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding (1995).
17Year: 1995
22Table2





















United Kingdom 27.80 62.7
United States 37.94 63.6
18Data-base described in Deininger and Squire (1996).
19Year: 1995
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